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a dissonance of discourses: literary theory, 
ideology, and translation in mo yan and chinese 
literary studies
Lucas Klein
abstract
Mo Yan’s 2012 Nobel Prize for Literature quickly turned into the most 
controversial international literary prize of recent memory. The controversy 
took place largely in English, and largely on the American Internet, where 
as much as Mo Yan was honored as being an important literary voice from 
a country whose contemporary cultural products are often neglected, he was 
criticized for supporting the Chinese Communist Party and its government. 
Defenders have pointed out that the politics in his fiction are neither as simple 
nor as straightforward as his party membership might otherwise indicate, but 
critics have said he writes a “daft hilarity” in a “diseased language,” calling 
his works in translation “superior to the original in their aesthetic unity and 
sureness.” Taking a detailed look at the controversy and debate, I examine 
the theoretical assumptions and stakes at work in the reading of Mo Yan and 
his Nobel, with attention to their ideological underpinnings, followed with a 
discussion on the importance of considering translation and the relationship 
between literary reading and politics. I close with a look toward a broadly 
applicable model of internationalist reading I call translational.
keywords: Nobel prize, Chinese literature, literary theory, translation, 
Mo Yan
In 2004, then-Princeton professor of Chinese Perry Link reviewed a book 
by a then-associate professor of Chinese at Yale: “Laughlin writes in the 
fashionable language of contemporary Western academe,” he suggested 
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of Charles Laughlin’s Chinese Reportage. Link not only criticized literary 
theoretical “verbiage” as “often unclear or unnecessary,” he questioned its 
applicability to Chinese literary studies at all: “On prisons, for example, he 
quotes Michel Foucault. . . . [but] the common pattern in China has been 
to organize prisoners to watch one another—nearly the opposite of what 
Foucault describes.” Moreover, “Laughlin’s ‘theoretical’ language is entirely 
Western-based; he does not look into Chinese theories of literature . . . 
Modish anti-hegemonism turns out to be the latest Western hegemonism.”1
In a response sent to the Modern Chinese Literature and Culture distribu-
tion list, Laughlin defended his points and offered examples of moments he 
found Link to be misreading, or indeed misquoting. He also recollected his 
responses to key moments in Link’s career: “When Perry Link first began to 
decry the baleful influence of ‘theory’ on modern Chinese literary studies a 
dozen years ago . . . I was not sure I understood what the big deal was. This 
is no longer the age of ‘China hands.’ I thought those of us with degrees in 
Chinese literature were engaged in the study of literature. . . . These methods, 
concepts, and the intellectual trends to which they sometimes adhere may 
not all be equally welcome, but I believe those who would engage in the 
study of literature—yes, even Chinese literature—should at least gain some 
degree of facility with them.”2
In late 2004, this may have been the last skirmish in the “theory wars” of 
Chinese literary studies, a debate that had crescendoed in the early nineties 
(later than similar “wars” in other academic disciplines) and whose oppos-
ing forces divided largely generationally. By now, another decade later, the 
arguments of the younger generation have turned into plain common sense, 
and any erstwhile resistance to theory is seen as another iteration of theory 
itself, even, and especially, in modern Chinese literature.3 One instance of 
the value of theory, particularly relating to questions of ideology and dis-
course, is highlighted when literature appears in international circulation, 
in translation, and with international prizes. Indeed, in the debates follow-
ing the honoring of Chinese novelist Mo Yan (莫言) (b. 1955, penname of 
Guan Moye [管谟业]) with the 2012 Nobel Prize for Literature, we see the 
inextricability of questions of literary theory as they pertain to the reading of 
literature from China. Coincidentally, it is Link and Laughlin—along with 
a younger scholar, Anna Sun—who have squared off in the new theoretical 
debate. Looking at this instance of literature in the world, I will examine 
the theoretical assumptions and stakes at work in the reading of Mo Yan 
and his Nobel, with attention to their ideological underpinnings, before 
making a point about the importance of considering translation amidst the 
relationship between literary reading and politics.
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At stake is the role of translation in working toward non-ethnocentric 
representations of China and Chinese literature. In other words, an import-
ant aspect to the representation of Chinese literature is the representation 
of translation, both of translation from Chinese and of the international or 
translational work that Chinese literature performs as it draws from and 
represents other cultures and literatures. My argument is that against the 
ideologically simplifying representations of Mo Yan, attention to translation 
both of and in his works can offer a theoretically and politically produc-
tive representation of China, its literature, and its interactions with, not 
 opposition to, the rest of the world.
The Politics of Not Reading and Checking the News
The arguments that the Nobel has spawned demonstrate that we are not 
in what Terry Eagleton calls After Theory, nor are we dealing with what he 
lays out in Literary Theory: An Introduction, with “isms” and schools succeed-
ing each other in chronological progression.4 Rather, we live in what Jonathan 
Culler presents in Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction, with questions 
on how to read engaging each other in an endlessly contemporary debate.5 
In terms of authorial intent, for instance, we can follow “The Intentional 
Fallacy” and assume that the text itself is the only proper embodiment of 
what the author was trying to say, or agree with Roland Barthes that “The 
Death of the Author” constitutes the birth of the reader.6 Or we can see, with 
Foucault, the author as a function serving to limit meaning.7 And if we are 
interested in unlimited meaning, we can understand Derrida’s Il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte as allowing for the validity of an author’s presentation of his own 
work, or that the author’s statements must also be subject to critical reading.8 
Not that we need such theoretical argumentation about indeterminacy of 
meaning: meaning is indeterminate simply because the same text will mean 
different things to different people at different times, and determining or 
asserting one person’s meaning over another’s must take place extra-textually. 
“Normally, we assume that meaning implies intent,” Perry Link writes, yet 
words may nonetheless be used in ways where neither the instigator nor the 
recipient is “conscious of the word’s role in conveying the meaning.”9 But if 
textuality can extend across the historical context of literary production and 
consumption, what about the politics or ethics of the text when the author 
has made his political and moral standpoints clear? All possibilities seem to 
be on the table at once.
173Li t era ry  t h e o ry, i d e o Lo g y, a n d  t ra n s Lat i o n  i n  M o  ya n 
One possibility is that context and assumptions of authorial position 
have so overdetermined judgment that reading the literature in question is 
no longer necessary for coming up with a stance on ethics. This seems to 
be behind Mo Yan’s emergence as the most controversial Nobel Literature 
Laureate in recent memory.10 When Salman Rushdie, for instance, calls 
Mo Yan “a patsy of the régime,” he shows no hint of having read Mo Yan.11 
Interestingly, when Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini sentenced Rushdie to death 
for The Satanic Verses, Rushdie commented, “I doubt very much Khomeini 
or anyone else in Iran has read the book” (he was probably right; “the 
name ‘Satanic verses’ is an invention of 19th century British Orientalists,” 
Eliot Weinberger explains, but the title was mistranslated in Arabic and 
its cognate languages as Al-Ayat ash-Shaytaniya, “with shaytan meaning 
Satan, and ayat meaning specifically the ‘verses of the Quran.’ As the phrase 
‘Satantic verses’ is completely unknown in the Muslim world, the title, then, 
implied the ultimate blasphemy: that the entire Quran was composed by 
Satan”).12 Rushdie called Mo Yan a patsy in response to a statement com-
paring censorship to security checks: “Airport security exists to guard us 
against terrorist attacks,” Rushdie wrote later. “Thus Mo Yan was making a 
moral equivalence between dissident literature and terrorism. That was and 
is objectionable, and I do not hesitate to condemn it.”13
To me, Mo Yan’s remarks sound like they come from a privileged yet 
all the same disempowered member of a society governed by an authoritarian 
regime. Rather than come to terms with his own complicity in the regime’s 
authoritarianism, he makes folksy gestures toward accepting a reality others 
more resolute than him might oppose. Despite being a well-regarded novelist, 
Mo Yan is not, or does not style himself as, an intellectual in the Chinese 
context; sophisticated as he is as a storyteller, in his Nobel acceptance speech 
he mentions that his formal schooling ended after primary school, with his 
literary education in the People’s Liberation Army Cultural Academy and his 
master’s in creative writing from the Lu Xun Literary Institute and Beijing 
Normal University less important to his identity. Remarks that present 
government control in terms of airport security deserve, in my mind, not so 
much condemnation as patient explanation of where such facile analogies 
lead. Indeed, condemnation from Rushdie and others, who seem unable to 
imagine a literary writer who is not an intellectual, reveals a double-bind: 
on the one hand Mo Yan is a “patsy,” on the other hand an author whose 
opinions must therefore reflect the methodological contemplations of 
a member of the intelligentsia. Nor do the double standards stop there: 
 translator Brendan O’Kane pointed this out when he blogged, “T.S. Eliot 
was a stone-cold anti-semite. Ezra Pound was a fascist-sympathizer who 
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spent the end of WWII in a cage. Roald Dahl was mean to just about 
everybody.” If we can accept these writers as “flawed men, men who were 
subject to all of the limitations of their condition,” O’Kane continues, “then 
it seems grossly unfair to condemn Mo Yan for the lesser sin of keeping 
his head down.”14 Not that we need to go as far back as Eliot, Pound, and 
Dahl to see a double standard at work in criticizing Mo Yan for his politics: 
I do not remember suggestions that the Swedish Academy was endorsing 
colonialism in rewarding V. S. Naipaul in 2001, or that Mario Vargas Llosa’s 
neoliberalism made his Nobel in 2010 a travesty.15 Of course, for all Naipaul’s 
and Vargas Llosa’s politics may be problematic or distasteful to many, they 
have not let those politics impinge upon the literature itself, as Mo Yan is 
claimed to have done. But also, Eliot, Pound, Dahl, and Naipaul are writers 
in English, and Vargas Llosa speaks English fluently as well, having lived 
for long periods in London; a difference between them and Mo Yan, then, 
is that neither translation nor the Anglophone imagination of the countries 
of these writers’ origin impedes on our understanding of the ethics of the 
literature as much as it does with Mo Yan’s Chinese and his China.
Indeed, the ways translation both reduplicates and yet also complicates 
how our discursive formation of China inscribes itself within our understand-
ing of Mo Yan are worth considering. His alleged comparison of censorship 
to airport security came during a forum in Stockholm days before his Nobel 
acceptance speech, answering a question about censorship with an anecdote 
having to go through security checks in airports; The Guardian reported this 
as Mo Yan calling censorship “a must.”16 Chinese-raised American novelist 
Yiyun Li (李翊云) has explained that this remark was “viewed as witty in 
the Chinese media and a blunder in the west,” but she did not explain that 
the key word in the interrogator’s question, “censorship,” was translated not 
as shencha (审查) but jiancha (检查), closer to “check” than “to censor,” and 
hence related to “security checks” at embassies and airports.17 Furthermore 
biyao de (必要的), like English “must,” is ambiguous; as I read it, his state-
ment wo xiang zhexie jiancha shi biyao de (我想这些检查是必要的) means 
not that he finds checks necessary but inevitable. I translate the rest of his 
sentence, about “checks on the news” (新闻检查) and not about censorship 
of literature, “while I’ve never praised the system of checks on the news, 
I imagine checks on the news exist in every country in the world” (我从
来没有赞美过新闻检查这种制度，但是我也认为新闻检查在世界上
每个国家都是存在的). It is another irony that Rushdie reiterates such 
mistranslation-wrought confusion in his condemnation of Mo Yan, since 
the Khomeini’s condemnation of The Satanic Verses was itself based on a 
mistranslation.
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Political Reading and the Morphology of Consciousness
Not reading, it turns out, is as important as reading is to our discursive 
 formation of China: a recent Words Without Borders issue on “Banned 
Chinese Writers,” for instance, extends a Cold War-era binary opposition 
vis-à-vis China with the implication that the non-banned have nothing 
valuable to say, since they must not be able to critique a system that does not 
ban them; it puts borders back in Words Without Borders.18 Could the act of 
reading take these borders down? This seems to be the stakes of Mo Yan’s 
appeal in his Nobel acceptance speech, that “For a writer, the best way to 
speak is by writing” (对一个作家来说，最好的说话方式是写作).19 In 
that case, Anna Sun’s article “The Diseased Language of Mo Yan” should 
be a relief for its attempt to buck the reductive view and offer a nuanced 
reading. Sun explains,
Mo Yan is a prolific writer who is a household name in China; his 
novels sell hundreds of thousands of copies . . . Politically, Mo Yan 
is clearly a writer with a strong social conscience, although he has 
not been a dissident; he is unafraid to satirize contemporary Chinese 
reality in his novels, and he is wryly conscious of the game of political 
negotiation he has to play with the state, sometimes setting his sting-
ing stories not in the socialist China but in the pre-revolutionary past.20
So indeed, “Why the discontent?”21
Ideology and its discourses form the basis for Sun’s critique of Mo Yan, 
constituting what she calls the “disease” of his language in its dependence 
on Mao-ti (毛体), or “Mao-style.”22 A “product of the aesthetic ideologies 
of Socialist China,” Sun defines this as “a particular language and sensi-
bility of writing promoted by Mao in the beginning of the revolution,” 
and describes elsewhere as “resolutely pedestrian, apart from its hyperbolic 
political vocabulary.”23 In other words, the “Mao-ti” is a discourse, or use 
of language, imbued with Maoist ideology, shaping the forms and content 
of Chinese literature, leaving writers unable to “speak truth to power in a 
language free of the scars of the revolution itself.”24
While the word discourse does not appear in her article, and she uses 
“ideology” only once, these notions underpin her definition of “Mao-ti” 
and her holding Mo Yan accountable for his fiction’s development from 
and dependence on its discursive formations. Sun, whose website tells that 
she teaches French Social Theory, puts them to deft, though unspoken, 
use in her review, as “it is in discourse,” as Foucault phrased it, “that power 
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and knowledge are joined together.”25 Since ideology as a term gets thrown 
about differently in different contexts, I understand it through translation: 
in Chinese, ideology is yishixingtai (意识形态), or the morphology (xingtai 
[形态]) that allows for consciousness (yishi [意识]). In Sun’s case, then, her 
consciousness of Mo Yan is made possible by her investment in an ideological 
representation of China, which is a China produced in part by contemporary 
American discourse about it.
Such notions of ideology and discourse can help explain the behavior 
of someone like Mo Yan and his investment in, and loyalty to, the Chinese 
Communist Party. His vice-presidency in the Chinese Writers’ Association 
(中国作家协会), for instance, may be one of the roots of his ideological 
buy-in to the Chinese system: after a revolution fought in part against an 
economy in which writers and cultural workers saw themselves as underpaid 
and exploited, the CWA was established to guarantee novelists, poets, and 
others a living wage and social benefits. Based on Lenin’s call for the tempo-
rary “use of the instruments, resources, and methods of state power against 
the exploiters, just as the temporary dictatorship of the oppressed class is 
necessary for the abolition of classes,” the CWA would become part of the 
socialist state structure into which everything else was being incorporated, 
so as to be free from the inherent conflicts of capitalism.26 From our point of 
view we can see the dangers implicit in state employment of writers, and one 
Chinese literary historian has called it “a direct ‘inheritance’ from the methods 
by which Stalin and Zhdanov controlled the literary and arts circles in the 
Soviet Union during the 1940s.”27 But compared with the current US system 
in which writers either have to rely on the market’s definition of saleable 
literature or else find day jobs (as part-timers in universities, for example, 
which may not provide sufficient health coverage), we can understand some 
of its attraction.28 Mo Yan, for one, has said plainly that his salary comes 
from the Ministry of Culture, and his “social and health insurance from 
them too . . . without a position, I can’t afford to get sick in China” (我在中
国文化部艺术研究院工作有一份工资 …… 享受福利医疗 …… 在中国
如果没有职业，生病我治不起啊).29 Insofar as the Writers’ Association is 
inscribed within the state system, it provides a vantage point for its members 
to see the Chinese state as supportive, rather than oppressive.
The Chinese Writers’ Association, then, is what Louis Althusser named 
an “ideological state apparatus,” calling on its members to support the 
Association and by extension the Chinese state via interpellation.30 Ideology 
and discourse have not only enjoyed fruitful afterlives in literary scholarship, 
they also impact the reading and writing about cultural others (as Sun no 
doubt also knows; she teaches another course called “Knowledge of the Other: 
Journey to the East”). My argument is that much of the discussion of Mo Yan’s 
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Nobel participates in the same ideologically reductive framework of China as 
has been going on for a long time. I will then draw on my elaboration of this 
point to make a larger conclusion about the roles and relationship between 
literary reading and politics, particularly in light of translation.
Interestingly, the history of writing about the People’s Republic of China 
in the United States reveals a remarkably literary enterprise, with experts 
interpreting signs and signals and reading between the proverbial lines of 
official statements and pronouncements to get at the truth of the authorial 
intent behind Chinese existence. Much of this is inscribed within the dis-
cursive knowledge production of the Cold War. James Angleton, counter-
intelligence chief at the CIA from 1954 to 1975 (and inspiration for the 2006 
film The Good Shepherd), was a graduate of Yale’s English department who, as 
Eliot Weinberger puts it, “believed that those trained in the New Criticism, 
with its seven types of ambiguity, were particularly suited to the interpretation 
of intelligence data.”31 Kremlinology, too, involved literary close-readings of 
what information could be gleaned from behind the iron curtain, which led 
to Pekingology, the reading of the court politics in Zhongnanhai, the seat 
of government in the Chinese capital. A deconstructive reading of the term 
Pekingology would mention the signification of a cabal of Hong Kong–based 
“China watchers” mired in logocentric faith in their ability to produce stable 
knowledge of the country into which they were “peeking.” But criticism 
and critique of the ideology and discursive practices of academics studying 
China is not new: James Peck pointed out over forty years ago how the work 
of American China experts “reinforced, at times deepened, the ideological 
justifications that support America’s role in Asia and her attitudes toward 
China”—attitudes defined by a view of China as having, in the words of 
the “father of containment,” US ambassador George Kennan, “fallen into 
the hands of a group of embittered fanatics . . . consumed with ambition 
to extend to further areas of Asia the dictatorial authority they now wield 
over the Chinese people themselves.”32 In other words, the Pekingologists 
joined American foreign policy strategists in a project of demonizing and 
containing China through the knowledge about their object they produced.
This is not to suggest that Sun believes China should be contained, 
though at any rate the terms of knowledge produced about China have 
changed since before Richard Nixon’s visit. She does, however, contain 
Chinese culture within an American standard, valorizing what coheres with 
the association of creative writing and political liberalism taken as a given 
in America, and denigrating what does not:
unlike the great novelists who grapple with the harsher side of the human 
condition—Dickens, Hardy, and Faulkner, for example—Mo Yan’s 
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work lacks something important which these authors have, although 
it is seldom spoken of: aesthetic conviction. The aesthetic power of 
these authors is the torch that illuminates for us the dark and painful 
truth of humanity. The effect of Mo Yan’s work is not illumination 
through skilled and controlled exploitation, but disorientation and 
frustration due to his lack of coherent aesthetic consideration.33
I would have thought readers in China would know better, that they would 
be able to accommodate more complexity, or that, aware of the history of 
conceptualizations of China as “the sick man of Asia” (东亚病夫) since 
the late nineteenth century, they would be circumspect about what they 
called “diseased.” It’s interesting to note, however, that China-as-produced 
 knowledge can wield power over discourse about China even when the writer 
in question was not raised in the capitalist West.34
Sun’s ideological acceptance of universalist notions comes clear in her 
general statements on literature, pronounced as if trans-historical judg-
ments could apply: “The highest calling of the writer is to be moral without 
being moralistic,” she writes in the final paragraph, “and to write with an 
aesthetic sensibility that is constitutive of his or her moral commitment.” 
Her  implication is that Maoist China was moralistic and yet immoral. The 
problem is that, for Mao and China from 1949 to the 1980s, such humanistic 
views of literature and society would have been read as contaminated by 
bourgeois ideology, or the way the capitalist class convinced the peasantry 
and proletariat that what was good for capitalism would serve their interests 
as workers, as well.
Chinese Audiences and the Quest for Universality
Going too far in the denunciation of claims of universal morality as bourgeois 
ideology ends with the proscriptions and prescriptions of Mao’s “Yan’an Talks 
on Literature and Art” (在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话), which Sun calls 
“Mo Yan’s education” and his “genuine attachment” to a literature valuable only 
as propaganda for the revolution.35 This is the moment to turn to Perry Link, 
who noted in ’93 that “After escaping into critical theory, [we] find that some 
of its terms come from European Marxists who were indirectly influenced 
by Mao . . . a serious problem arises of how to situate two Maoisms within 
a single worldview.”36 Despite his unwillingness to engage in literary theory, 
Link clearly sees Maoism not only as a political system, but a discursive or 
ideological one as well. This view of Maoism underpins Link’s treatment of 
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Mo Yan, raising for him the question of “how and to what extent a writer’s 
immersion in, and adjustment to, an authoritarian political regime affects what 
he or she writes.”37 Describing fictional treatments of China’s real history, Link 
explains, “Today’s Communist leaders, worried that their power could suffer 
by association with these Maoist disasters, declare the topics ‘sensitive’ and 
largely off-limits for state-sponsored writers.” Yet Mo Yan has been part of 
what Link calls the “fashion in Chinese fiction” of “rewriting history,” which 
“holds great interest for readers who are still struggling to confront the ques-
tion of ‘what happened?’ during and after the country’s Maoist spasm.” Lest 
anyone think Mo Yan brave for broaching the topic of the Maoist period, 
even or especially as a state-sponsored writer, Link adds, “Mo Yan’s solution 
(and he is not alone here) has been to invoke a kind of daft hilarity when 
treating ‘sensitive’ events.” For Link, the “daft hilarity” leaves out literature’s 
responsibility to ethics: “Mo Yan has great fun with the craziness but leaves 
out the disaster,” he writes.
Link is certainly right in noticing that Mo Yan is not alone amongst 
Chinese cultural figures in laughing to keep from crying about their  country’s 
recent history (anyone familiar with contemporary Chinese art might see a 
similar tendency in the “Cynical Realism” of Fang Lijun [方力钧] [b. 1963] 
and Yue Minjun [岳敏君] [b. 1962]). For Link, this coheres too easily with 
“the regime’s point of view,” that “this mode of writing is useful not just 
because it diverts a square look at history but because of its function as a 
safety valve . . . For the regime, to treat them as jokes might be better than 
banning them outright.” While this is also true, it leaves a very limited 
role for nuance or subtlety in the text: can literature take an implicit stand 
against the government it was written under, even if it owes its existence 
in part to the confluences of political policy? And if literature is so totally 
commanded by its political circumstances, can it have any social purpose at 
all? Does anything change when the writing in question is read outside the 
immediate context of its initial publication? Is the writer’s only way to be 
“moral without being moralistic,” in Sun’s phrase, to write for the overthrow 
of a dictatorship? Whereas in 2000 Link wrote, “The creativity of readers 
and audiences in adapting literature to their own uses was always present, 
even during the high tide of Maoism,” he refuses the same flexibility to 
Mo Yan.38 Here, Link’s answers to these questions seem overdetermined by 
his standpoint toward Maoism.
Link describes Mo Yan as a writer unambiguously “inside the system.” 
Comparing him to his “outside the system” counterpart, imprisoned 2010 
Nobel Peace Prizewinner Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波) (b. 1955), Link reveals the 
basis and bias of his own discursive regime. Saying “It would be wrong for 
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spectators like you and me, who enjoy the comfort of distance, to demand 
that Mo Yan risk all and be another Liu Xiaobo,” Link comes off as more 
aware of his own ideological standpoint than does Anna Sun. Nevertheless, 
in response to Mo Yan’s statement of hope that Liu Xiaobo “get his free-
dom in good health as soon as possible,” Link wonders, with no evidence 
whatsoever, “Was Mo Yan’s ‘in good health’ phrase something that Chinese 
authorities had supplied to him, perhaps to prepare the way in interna-
tional opinion for Liu Xiaobo’s ‘seeking medical treatment abroad’?”39 (So 
far, this has not happened.) Later, Link flatly states, “I have never been a 
handmaiden to U.S. power”; such speculative decryption, however, demon-
strates that the methods of Pekingology, in which the various statements 
and pronouncements coming out of China are deciphered as if they could 
reveal a stable sense of what is truly going on within the central authority, 
have not expired.40
In an online article titled “What Mo Yan’s Detractors Get Wrong,” 
Charles Laughlin responds to both Anna Sun and Perry Link. Though he 
has earlier argued in favor of applying literary theory to Chinese literature, 
he does not indulge in theoretical issues or engage in ideological critique 
for a popular, general readership. To Link, his tack is towards specificity 
of context; about criticisms of Mo Yan’s “daft hilarity,” Laughlin explains, 
“Mo Yan writes about the periods he writes about because they were  traumatic, 
not because they were hilarious,” and reminds that “Mo Yan is writing 
primarily for a Chinese audience, not to instruct foreign readers about the 
tragedies of Chinese history” (Link replies that his “own worry is about the 
actual readers,” whom he calls “numerous, mostly young, and not very well 
schooled in Chinese history”: “How does ‘daft hilarity’ affect them? . . . 
Mo Yan’s giddy treatments of history divert attention from things that are 
hard to look at but that still lurk in the culture at deeper levels.”)41 Whereas 
Link’s attitude toward literature seems governed by opposing what he sees 
as Maoism, Laughlin presents a more fluid view of how to assess literary 
value and morality.
Laughlin is more willing to indicate Anna Sun’s prejudices, saying that 
by Sun’s argument, “it seems doubtful that the prize could,” or should, “ever 
go to a Chinese writer.” He also notes that her framing of Mo Yan is like the 
Chinese Writers’ Association’s “line” on Gao Xingjian (高行健) (b. 1940), 
the naturalized French citizen who is the only other Chinese-language writer 
to have won the Nobel in literature: “not that his works contain politically 
unacceptable ideas . . . [but] that Gao Xingjian is a mediocre writer.” And 
yet, the quality of writing as such is important to Laughlin, who argues 
that Sun’s complaint that Mo Yan writes in “a jumble of disparate linguistic 
181Li t era ry  t h e o ry, i d e o Lo g y, a n d  t ra n s Lat i o n  i n  M o  ya n 
 registers” is “a strange argument to make about a twenty-first-century 
writer”: “One thinks of the emergence of avant-garde techniques like stream 
of  consciousness or psychological realism . . . employed by authors such 
as Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce . . ., of the landmark 
absurdism of a Franz Kafka, George Orwell, or Jorge Luis Borges.” Thus, 
while Laughlin faults Sun for finding Mo Yan “wanting” when measured 
“against writers of much earlier eras (Dickens, Hardy, and Faulkner),” he 
locates her double standard in her disqualification from “comparison to 
Pynchon, Rushdie, and DeLillo,” say, not in that she compares him with 
non-Chinese writers tout court. Though it may represent a strategic dis-
mantling of her framework, Laughlin here seems to buy into the premise 
of Sun’s review, which is that writers can be evaluated across, rather than 
within or between, languages, cultures, and eras. This is the dark side to the 
rosy notion of being “engaged in the study of literature,” quoted above; too 
much emphasis on “literature,” as if assumptions about what makes it good 
or bad, moral or immoral, were the same for all periods and places, tends to 
de-emphasize matters of context and locality, and it opens Laughlin up to 
criticism from Link later.
Noting that Link does not ultimately answer the question of his title, 
“Does this Writer Deserve the Prize?” Laughlin writes, “The Nobel Peace 
Prize is not awarded for literary achievements, nor is it awarded by the 
same committee that awards the Nobel Prize in Literature . . . In fact, it’s 
precisely this confusion that lies at the heart of the debates about Mo Yan”42 
(Link parries, “Henry Kissinger won a peace prize. If that happened, what 
is not possible?” Then he explains, “The title of my essay was written by 
editors of The New York Review of Books, and I did not see it until the 
piece came out”).43 But by arguing that Mo Yan “is being evaluated by the 
criteria of the Peace Prize . . . when we should really be talking about his 
literary accomplishments,” even as he observes that “no literature can be 
[apolitical],” Laughlin lines up ideologically with Chinese social discourse’s 
recent turn to see literature as autonomous. This is what Julia Lovell calls 
“the uncomfortable play-off in the modern era between China, the West, 
and the quest for universality,” which she sees in China’s “quest” for a Nobel 
Prize in Literature; the dream of a Chinese Nobel in Literature, she writes, 
demonstrates China’s faith “that the autonomous aesthetic can effectively 
resolve tensions between . . . the nation and the world” even as “the often 
tumultuous and heavily politicized workings of this aesthetic and of the 
search for a Nobel Prize in twentieth-century China also point to real-world 
imbalances and inequalities that belie the universalistic promise of national 
and world literatures.”44
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Laughlin’s back-and-forth on whether Mo Yan should be considered 
amidst and within the circulations of world literature and its broader base 
of ethical considerations betrays its own ideological need, popular (if dubi-
ous) amongst scholars of modern and contemporary Chinese literature, for 
Mo Yan’s prize to be “good for [the study of ]” Chinese literature—though to 
be sure, public debates such are this are undoubtedly beneficial for Chinese 
literary studies.45 Nevertheless, the tension between his two points can 
be reconciled, though it requires differentiating between Sun’s and Link’s 
arguments to achieve it.
West-Centrism and Reading Translation
In response to Laughlin’s critique, Link faults him and others for “West-
centrism,” his admittedly clumsy translation of the Chinese term he wants, 
“xifangzhongxinzhuyi” (西方中心主义). He sums up part of Laughlin’s 
argument—“The world now has Woolf, Joyce, Pynchon, Rushdie, DeLillo, 
and others. Anna Sun apparently is lagging behind”—and then adds, 
“What Laughlin calls ‘the world,’ however, is not the world, but the 
West. Literary scholars in the West rail against ‘hegemonism’ and ‘post- 
colonialism’ but in fact practice these very things by establishing trends 
and then measuring the rest of the world by how well it imitates them.”46 
Link is not being fair to Laughlin, who also notes Mo Yan’s links to the 
first century b.c.e. Records of the Grand Historian (史記), and “adventurous, 
bold, and humorous novels” such as sixteenth-century Journey to the West 
(西遊記) and fourteenth- century Outlaws of the Marsh (水滸傳) (some-
times translated as The Water Margin). Wanting to present himself as on 
her side, Link is also too polite to point out that Anna Sun’s “Diseased 
Language” likewise falls for its own West-centrism in denigrating Mo Yan 
against “the great novelists . . . of the human condition.” He indicates his 
distance from her point of view, however, in asking, “Is Mo Yan really 
part of a flow that began with Dickens and Hardy and has now come to 
Faulkner and García Márquez? Why should he be? . . . Why do we put 
him in a Western bag?”
Link stops short of proposing a “Sinocentrism” to replace or redress 
“West-centrism,” but insofar as Sun’s tactic is to strike from both sides, she 
puts the ills of any such centrism on display. Describing “the true legacy of 
Chinese literature” to which Mo Yan, in his childhood under Mao, “did not 
know he had been denied access,” she relies on essentials:
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the splendid poetry and essays of the Tang and Song dynasties; the 
great novels of the Ming and Qing Dynasties; not to mention the 
canonical Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mencius that had 
long been the backbone of early education in imperial China, from 
the private academy of aristocratic families to the schoolrooms of 
rural village children.47
China’s literary heritage is indeed astounding in both breadth and depth. 
Yet by referring to poetry of the Tang and Song, and great novels of the Ming 
and Qing (唐诗宋词明清小说), Sun replays the bowdlerized literary his-
tory of grade school textbooks, which overlooks, for instance, poetry of the 
Ming and Qing, or fiction from the Song and earlier. Laying it all on the 
“backbone” of Confucian texts, she latches it to what Jean-François Billeter 
has called China’s “imperial ideology,” which he explains, “What we today 
regard as ‘Chinese civilization’ . . . is closely linked to imperial despotism.”48 
Sun’s true legacy of Chinese literature, then, is literature written by and for 
the small, privileged population in imperial China who were literate and 
had access to an education in the classics, and where “schoolrooms of rural 
village children” memorized Confucius and Mencius to the effect that they 
would be taken care of by the aristocratic families of private academies.49 
Though the class politics are different, Sun’s phrase “true legacy of Chinese 
literature” hits the same rhetorical notes as politicos and pundits do when 
talking about the “real America.”
Sun’s comparison of Mo Yan against premodern Chinese literature 
adheres to another ideological construction of China, which privileges 
the premodern over the modern.50 Of course, this is the inverse of China’s 
own ideology; as Sun notes, in the twentieth century “the state deliberately 
administered a radical break with China’s literary past.” In large part, then, 
the “Western bag” to which Link refers is a bag of modern China’s own 
fabrication. Link says as much, as well, explaining that “After the ‘opening’ 
of China in the 1980s, cultural elites promoted the watchword ‘walking 
toward the world.’”51 He goes on to complain, however: “Westerners as well 
as Chinese have enjoyed and perpetuated this West-centrism. How flattering 
that gifted writers from that mysterious socialist country on the other side of 
the world see us as the literary mainstream and forefront!” But one must be 
quite a cultural egotist to see all moments of cultural exchange as evidence 
others see you as “the literary mainstream and forefront.”
Link’s denunciation of “West-centrism” sounds nice, because “scholars 
in the West rail against ‘hegemonism,’” but does it resonate? Consider what 
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Jonathan Stalling, who is both an editor of Chinese Literature Today and an 
associate professor of English, says about teaching Mo Yan:
Rather than reading Mo Yan’s work as “magical” or “hallucina-
tory” realism, to avoid reading Chinese literature monoculturally 
in Western literary terms, I introduce my students to the Chinese 
philosophical ideas active in classical Chinese literary works like The 
Story of the Stone (also known as the Dream of the Red Chamber), in 
which the Buddhist notion that a phenomenon is neither real nor 
unreal . . . gives readers a point of access to the destabilizing effect 
of Mo Yan’s writing style.52
Stalling’s colleague at Oklahoma, Robert Con Davis-Undiano, has also 
noted that “the Chinese novel as Mo Yan practices it” owes as much to 
“a well-established tradition of vernacular fiction . . . with such works as 
The Water Margin, Journey to the West, Dream of the Red Chamber, and 
others” as it does to William Faulkner and Gabriel García Márquez.53 
Link wonders “Why is it not quite all right for [Mo Yan’s fiction] to be 
rooted in the  storytelling tradition of his native Shandong, which itself 
includes flights of fancy like talking animals and aggrieved ghosts?” On 
the contrary, evidently it is “quite all right” indeed.
Stalling’s and Davis-Undiano’s cultural contextualization is based on an 
agenda to move past reading “monoculturally in Western terms,” but is in 
line as well with what the author has said about his own background: in his 
Nobel lecture he cites Faulkner and García Márquez as inspirations, but also 
Pu Songling (蒲松齡) (1640–1715), whose tradition he says he carries on.54 
Link doubts this, saying, “Writers [in the 1980s] liked to claim influences 
from this or that famous foreign writer, even if they had read little or nothing 
of the foreign writer’s work. Mo Yan . . . says he ‘was greatly inspired’ by 
Faulkner and García Márquez, but in the next sentence says ‘I had not read 
either of them extensively.’”55 Link is quoting from Goldblatt’s translation 
of the Nobel lecture; unaccountably, he seems not to have consulted the 
Chinese, in which Mo Yan says not that he hadn’t read them extensively, but 
rather, humbly, that his “reading of them wasn’t really serious” (我对他们的
阅读并不认真).56 Additionally, the first full-length novels by Faulkner and 
García Márquez to appear in Chinese translation (The Sound and the Fury 
and Cien años de soledad, respectively), were published in 1984, coincidentally 
the year Mo Yan’s own publication history begins; as more of their works 
became available in Chinese in the years that have followed, he may have 
read more.57
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Link’s sense of the author function as stabilizer of meaning is so strong 
he can invoke it to second-guess the author’s own statements about his 
work, but I do not bring up Mo Yan’s extra-literary expressions as any kind 
of trump card of authorial intent. The way Mo Yan understands his own 
work may be relevant without being any kind of last word. Rather, the issue 
as I see it is about framing: Mo Yan frames his work a certain way, repre-
senting a discourse imbued with certain ideological factors, just as Stalling 
and Davis-Undiano and Sun and Link and Laughlin do. All discourse 
about literature must engage in some kind of framing, and Mo Yan, with 
Stalling and Davis-Undiano along with him, frame Mo Yan not nationally, 
and certainly not “West-centrically,” but cross-culturally, transnationally, 
even translationally. They frame his literature as literature in the world: by 
mentioning premodern Chinese fiction in the same breath as American 
modernism and Latin American magic realism, Mo Yan indicates that his 
fiction translates one into the discourse of the other, merging them into an 
aesthetic where each becomes recognizable to the other. This marks another 
problem with Link’s rebuke of “West-centrism”: Mo Yan is not proclaiming 
that “he has catapulted himself through the experience of the West all the 
way to post-modernism,” but rather that he enables the postmodern an 
access point into China’s literary heritage, and China’s premodern literary 
heritage an access point to postmodernity.58
Translations, of course, are another field in which ideology and dis-
course frame the literature in question, and as the above example about 
“censorship” translating “checks on the news” shows, translations from 
Chinese in particular are framed according to the ideological formations 
about the place the language originated. And yet the ideological assumptions 
our critics bring to Mo Yan are also evident in how they frame translation 
itself. Anna Sun, for instance: on the one hand, she says, “many superb 
Chinese writers’ work does not read well in translation . . . no matter how 
good the translator might be”; on the other hand, “the most popular work 
by Chinese writers in English translation today” is popular because it is 
too translatable—“the kind of work that has broad strokes, vivid characters, 
and dramatic plots, such as Mo Yan’s novels.”59 Rather than negating the 
ideology behind her presentation of Chinese literature and China, her 
to-and-fro on translation defines it: as Slavoj Žižek, who knows something 
about contradicting himself, has written, “An ideology really succeeds 
when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as 
arguments in its favour.”60
Sun’s argument about “translatability” and Mo Yan deserves a closer 
look. “Open any page,” she says of Mo Yan’s writing in Chinese,
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and one is treated to a jumble of words that juxtaposes rural  vernacular, 
clichéd socialist rhetoric, and literary affectation. It is broken, profane, 
appalling, and artificial; it is shockingly banal. The language of Mo Yan 
is repetitive, predictable, coarse, and mostly devoid of aesthetic value.
And yet,
The English translations of Mo Yan’s novels, especially by the excel-
lent Howard Goldblatt, are in fact superior to the original in their 
aesthetic unity and sureness. The blurb for The Republic of Wine 
from Washington Post says: “Goldblatt’s translation renders Mo Yan’s 
shimmering poetry and brutal realism as work akin to that of Gorky 
and Solzhenitsyn.” But in fact, only the “brutal realism” is Mo Yan’s; 
the “shimmering poetry” comes from a brilliant translator’s work.
Praising the translator, she denigrates the translator.61 Link, for his part, says, 
“Anna Sun is right.”62 It can be hard, though, to compare an original with a 
translation; the emotional valences of style can get confused with the reader’s 
positive or negative experiences in reading first or second languages. And style 
is difficult to define, which is why poems often enjoy so many translations 
and retranslations (for better or for worse the same has not occurred with 
contemporary Chinese novels in English).63
But subjective evaluations about “shockingly banal” writing or “brilliant” 
translations are meaningless in the absence of direct quotation (Franco 
Moretti’s “distant reading” has picked up some currency in recent debates 
on world literature, but if, pace Jean-François Lyotard, we are going to be 
incredulous toward metanarratives, we should base our assertions not only 
on petits récits, but on petites lectures, as well).64 Opening “any page,” then, 
here is a passage from Mo Yan’s Hong gaoliang jiazu (红高粱家族), followed 
by its translation by Howard Goldblatt in Red Sorghum: A Novel of China:
有人说这个放羊的男孩是我，我不知道是不是我。我曾对高密
东北乡极端热爱，曾经对高密东北乡极端仇恨，长大后努力学
习马克思主义，我终于悟到：高密东北乡无疑是地球上最美丽
最丑陋、最超脱现实、最圣洁最龌龊、最英雄好汉最王八蛋、
最喝酒最能爱的地方。生存在这块土地上的父老乡亲们，喜食
高粱，每年都大量种植。八月深秋，无边无际的高粱红成洸洋
的血海，高粱高密辉煌，高粱凄婉可人，高粱爱情激荡。秋风
苍凉，阳光很旺，瓦蓝的天上游荡着一朵 朵丰满的白云，高粱
上滑动着一朵朵丰满白云的紫红色影子。一队队暗红色的人在
高粱棵子里穿梭拉网, 几十年如一日。他们杀人越货，精忠报
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国，他们演出过一幕 幕英勇悲壮的舞剧，使我们这些活着的
不肖子孙相形见绌，在进步的同时，我真切地感到种的退化。
(“Someone said that the little goatherd was me, but I don’t know. 
I had learned to love Northeast Gaomi Township with all my heart, 
and to hate it with unbridled fury. I didn’t realize until I’.d grown 
up that Northeast Gaomi Township is easily the most beautiful and 
most repulsive, most unusual and most common, most sacred and 
most corrupt, most heroic and most bastardly, hardest-drinking and 
 hardest-loving place in the world. The people of my father’s genera-
tion who lived there ate sorghum out of preference, planting as much 
of it as they could. In late autumn, during the eighth lunar month, 
vast stretches of red sorghum shimmered like a sea of blood. Tall and 
dense, it reeked of glory; cold and graceful, it promised enchantment; 
passionate and loving, it was tumultuous.
The autumn winds are cold and bleak, the sun’s rays intense. 
White clouds, full and round, float in the tile-blue sky, casting full 
round purple shadows onto the sorghum fields below. Over decades 
that seem but a moment in time, lines of scarlet figures shuttled 
among the sorghum stalks to weave a vast human tapestry. They 
killed, they looted, and they defended their country in a valiant, 
stirring ballet that makes us unfilial descendants who now occupy the 
land pale by comparison. Surrounded by progress, I feel a nagging 
sense of our species’ regression.”)65
I am sure this is neither the most banal section of Mo Yan’s Chinese, nor 
the most brilliant example of Goldblatt’s English. But I do not see evi-
dence that the “brutal realism” is Mo Yan’s while the “shimmering poetry” is 
Goldblatt’s, or that the English is superior in “aesthetic unity and sureness”; 
rather, this is a strong translation of an intricate passage. Goldblatt seems more 
willing to rely on cliché than Mo Yan (his jiduan re’ai . . . jiduan chouhen [极
端热爱 …… 极端仇恨] is more “extreme love” and “extreme hatred” than 
“love . . . with all my heart” and “hate it with unbridled fury”), and occasion-
ally Goldblatt trips over an awkward phrase to accommodate the details of 
the Chinese (“ate sorghum out of preference” is more cumbersome, I think, 
than xishi gaoliang [喜食高粱] in expressing that people liked to, rather 
than were forced to, consume the grain). There is also a moment of rather 
loose translation, where Goldblatt takes xiao (肖) for its homophone xiao  
(孝) in buxiao zisun (不肖子孙); though this might accentuate what readers 
in English will understand as a Chinese cultural trait, it should probably be 
unworthy descendants rather than “unfilial descendants.” But the most graceful 
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moments of Goldblatt’s English—“vast stretches of red sorghum shimmered 
like a sea of blood . . . passionate and loving, it was tumultuous”; “White 
clouds . . . float in the tile-blue sky, casting full round purple shadows onto 
the sorghum fields below”—are also graceful in Mo Yan’s Chinese, and even 
where the translation is most culturally nativizing—such as “a valiant, stirring 
ballet”—it is only a slight step from Mo Yan’s metaphor of a dance perfor-
mance in Chinese, yingyong beizhuang de wuju (英勇悲壮的舞剧). Moreover, 
Goldblatt achieves this while representing both the style and the pacing of the 
source text, so that readers in English can have an appropriate sense that they 
are not only reading what Mo Yan has written, but how he has written, as well.66
Mo Yan’s Chinese and Goldblatt’s English are not identical, however. 
In the translation, the narrator says, “I didn’t realize until I’d grown up” that 
Gaomi was full of contradictions. In the Chinese text, the narrator is more 
specific: zhangdahou nuli xuexi Makesizhuyi (长大后努力学习马克思主义) 
means after I had grown up and diligently studied Marxism.67 The way the 
English publication frames Red Sorghum as A Novel of China is an example 
of discursive formation in American ideology: China becomes an object of 
knowledge, and any reader encountering Red Sorghum will not only have sim-
ply read a story, but will finish with a greater “understanding” of China. But 
Cold War ideology does not relinquish control so easily when it has created 
an object of knowledge such as China; editing out the mention of Marxism 
prevents readers from understanding the importance of Marxism to China’s 
self-definition, and the pervasiveness with which Marxist rhetoric informs 
China’s views of itself. By relying on similar tropes of humanistic valuation 
and American discursive formation of China, Anna Sun does the same thing.
Mo Yan’s mention of Marxism in this paragraph may be a gratuitous 
example of the “Mao-ti” of which Sun speaks, or how, as Link puts it, 
“unnoticed linguistic habits reflect conceptual approaches to the world.”68 
But it may also be an example of how any given instant of discourse can work 
against the power implicit in larger discursive formations. Just as Faulkner’s 
Yoknapatawpha and García Márquez’s Macondo are seen as smaller 
versions of their authors’ countries, Mo Yan says he hopes “to make tiny 
Northeast Gaomi Township a microcosm of China, even of the whole world” 
(我希望把小小的 “高密东北乡” 写成中国乃至世界的缩影一样).69 The 
 contradictions that Mo Yan’s narrator claims he understands via Marxism 
are indeed what Marxists see as inherent to industrial development under 
capitalism.70 But the narrator says he understands Gaomi to inhabit these 
contradictions after having studied Marxism: does this mean Gaomi still 
embodies the contradictions inherent to capitalism even after the Communist 
revolution was supposed to reconcile them? That agricultural China could 
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exhibit contradictions unforeseen by Marx and unresolved by Mao? If so, 
then the narrator’s statement that, “Surrounded by progress, I feel a nagging 
sense of our species’ regression,” takes on a fuller sense of political criticism. 
The contradiction between shimmering poetry and brutal realism turns out 
to highlight just such a counter-discursive move.
The Sideways Gaze: Translational Readings
In their responses, both Laughlin and Link refer to Mao-wenti (毛文体), or 
“Mao style,” a term coined by Li Tuo (李陀) (b. 1939) in the eighties for the 
pervasive discourses of Maoism that had entered not only everyday speech 
but, Li Tuo claims, everyday thinking, as well.71 An essential component to 
“Mao style” as it appears in writings by Li Tuo and his circle, however, is how 
easily it has transformed from indoctrinating Chinese speakers into Maoism 
into a means of interpellating subjects into a neoliberal economic order. Here 
is noted poet Bei Dao (北島), for instance, describing the  Mao-wenti in his 
essay, “Ancient Enmity” (古老的敵意):
三十年多前，中國人生活在以“毛文體”代表的官方話語的巨大
陰影下。這種自 1949 年以來逐漸取得壟斷地位的官方話語，幾
乎禁錮了每個人的思想方式和表達方式，甚至戀愛方式。那年
頭，詞語與指涉的關係幾乎都被固定化下來，比如，“太陽”就
是毛澤東，“紅色”就是革命，“母親”就是祖國或者黨。
(Over thirty years ago, Chinese people lived under the great shadow 
of official discourse represented by the “Mao style.” This official 
discourse, which had gradually become monopolistic since 1949, all 
but shackled everyone’s ways of thinking and of self-expression, even 
of being in love. In those years, the relationships between words and 
their referents were fixed, so that “the sun” was Mao Zedong, “red” 
was Revolution, and “Mother” was the Homeland or the Party.)72
This sounds like Sun’s description of “Mao-ti.” But Bei Dao follows this with 
an equally trenchant accusation of discourse current in China today: “In this 
internet era of so-called globalization, the new language of ‘marching in step 
with the executioner,’ though it looks on the surface to be the opposite of 
what we had thirty years ago, nevertheless creates a desperation that makes 
people feel equally powerless” (在所謂全球化的網絡時代，這種新的“與
劊子手步調一致的”語言，與三十年前相比，雖表現形式相反，但同樣
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讓人因絕望而感到無力).73 Where Sun sounds triumphant, then, or at least 
relieved at the emergence of the “alternative to Mao-ti literature in China” by 
“writers in their 20s and 30s [whose] education took place . . . when China 
experienced an unprecedented period of economic growth,” writers and 
critics like Li Tuo and Bei Dao see the current discursive regime as equally 
threatening to creative and intellectual freedom as was the Mao style.74
The opposition Bei Dao sees between these two discourses, or between 
the two manifestations of the same discourse, is a struggle that he and writers 
like him have been facing since before Roland Barthes wrote Writing Degree 
Zero: namely, how can we write literature that stands in opposition both to the 
discursive dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the discursive dictatorship of 
socialist realism? For all that critics have tried, since before his exile from the 
People’s Republic of China, to label Bei Dao a “dissident” and conscript him 
into a fight over universalist notions of literary value, his writing shows one 
attempt to write at degree zero where, as Barthes puts it, “the noun can live 
without its article . . . pregnant with all the past and future specifications.”75
Mo Yan is not Bei Dao, and his writing does not seem to be as at odds 
with either discursive domination as Bei Dao’s. But the burden of politi-
cal engagement with discourses is not only on the writer. Publishers have 
a responsibility, as well, which is what Christopher Mattison points out 
when he faults editors for “focusing on ‘dissidence’ rather than ‘dissonance,’” 
but ultimately the role of finding the right politics of literature amidst the 
dissonance of discourses falls to the reader.76 Interestingly, Roland Barthes 
here can offer another tactic. In his journal of his trip to Cultural Revolution 
China in 1974, Barthes mentions a binary of approaches to understanding 
China: there are those, he writes, who make “an intent and constant effort 
to speak about China from the point of view of China; a gaze coming from 
the inside,” and then there is the insistence on seeing “China from the point 
of view of the West.” My attempt here has been to write against the latter 
point of view without adopting the former, for as Barthes says, “These two 
gazes are, for me, wrong. The right gaze is a sideways gaze.”77
Simply positing a “sideways gaze” as “the right gaze” is insufficient 
on its own; moreover, for all that this example represents an encounter 
between literary theory and Chinese reality, relying on Barthes here may be 
to succumb to what Link calls the latest Western hegemonism in the name 
of a modish anti-hegemonism. Viewing China and its cultural products 
from the perspective of only the West or only China (or, more probably 
for those of us working in English, a China imagined through its a priori 
construction by Western discourse with which it must contrast, such as Sun’s 
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proclamation of “the true legacy of Chinese literature” or Link’s opposition 
to the “Western bag” of “Faulkner and García Márquez” because the author 
“says” he had not “read” them “extensively”) is clearly too limited for accounts 
of these products’ circulation around and within the world. In and of itself, 
however, saying “sideways gaze” does nothing to ensure that the reader’s 
gaze won’t remain as ideologically predetermined as ever under the cover of 
a sideways appellation. A more specific itinerary in order, then, my particular 
attempt for a sideways gaze has been to read, to reuse a term I put forth 
above, translationally. Just as Mo Yan’s fiction can be an access point between 
global postmodernity and China’s literary heritage, a translational reading 
may approach a text—both before and after it has been translated—as a kind 
of translation, through which not only can the reader access its source and 
target cultures, but through which source and target cultures can access each 
other, as well. A translational reading that pays attention to source and target 
cultural contexts, and to the role of the translator and how a text may be 
shaped by the needs or interests of a range of powers in those contexts, can 
see ideology and discourse at work even as it derives its main legitimacy from 
detailed attention to the text (translation is ultimately textual, after all). By 
constantly shifting its own point of view, a translational reading can remain 
fluid, seeing and at times reconciling but not speaking from the perspective 
of any stable global position; in this way it can remain sideways. Around 
such moments of literature in the world as provided by the Nobel Prize, 
a translational methodology becomes all the more possible and necessary.
In the struggle between discourses, and in reading literature from 
around the world which responds to, ingests, and opposes a multitude of 
discourses, the reader becomes the judge of the political value of the writ-
ing in question. Inverting the Cold War mode of literary politics, then, in 
which the goings-on in Peking were understood as a literary text whose job 
the China watcher’s was to decode, we can now reach a political literacy, in 
which the reader, with the translational sideways gaze, can turn the reading 
of literature into an act of political resistance. Rather than asking if Chinese 
writers can “speak truth to power,” we may want to try, instead, to translate 
power through our readings.
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